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James Paul, Peter French, and Ann Cranston-Gingras 
Special education is under attack from outside the profession and is experiencing 
considerable dissention from inside as well. The challenges from outside are concerned 
with costs and accountability. Cost comparisons with other education services have led 
some to argue that the social benefits do not justify the costs of special education services 
(Dillon, 1994; Massachusetts Association of School Superintendents, 1997). Dissention 
inside the profession involves longstanding differences in perspective regarding fully 
integrated versus pull-out service delivery models (Fuchs & Fuchs, 1995; Shanker, 1994) 
and, increasingly, differences among researchers about the nature and representation of 
knowledge. 
Ethical issues lurk sometimes subtly behind and sometimes boldly in front of pro-
fessional challenges in special education interventions, policies, research, and teacher edu-
cation. Special educators rely on a complex foundation of justifying reasons for what they 
do, and how they do it. Everything from how disability is defined to the educational objec-
tives and the knowledge privileged as foundational for practice reflects a priori consider-
ations saturated with values and cultural meaning. 
It is surprising that a field so replete with such complexities of interests has devoted 
so little attention to the study and development of applied ethics. In a survey of doctoral 
programs in special education in 1995 only one required a course in ethics, although most 
said that ethics content was embedded in the content of different seminars (Paul, Kane, and 
Kane, 1996). A few respondents suggested that content in ethics was not needed in a Ph.D. 
program in special education. 
We believe that lessons learned in professional psychology with respect to the study 
of ethics are instructive for special educators. Increasingly, over the past three decades, 
doctoral programs in psychology have required courses in ethics because the approach of 
embedding ethics content lacked a foundational perspective, lacked continuity, and, for 
teaching purposes, relied too much on ethical issues emerging randomly in class discus-
sions and internships. Special education teachers, researchers, teacher educators, and pol-
icy-makers need more education and training in ethics to be able to address current moral 
dilemmas in assessment, instruction, curriculum, work with families, instructional compe-
tence, philosophy of service delivery, funding, and research. The articulation and applica-
tion of ethical theory needed to support practice and policy development are critical to the 
future of special education. 
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Education and Director of the Center for Migrant Education, University of South Florida. 
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Rather than enumerate the myriad of ethical issues in spe-
cial education and ethical theories to address them, we have 
elected to focus on four major ethical challenges to the field. 
1. The need to examine the moral and political stories, 
and ethical frameworks within which to understand 
them. 
2. The need for articulating character morality to com-
plement the more familiar choice morality that is used 
to think about ethical dilemmas in special education. 
3. The need to examine special education in the context 
of a liberal democracy. 
4. The need to develop an ethical basis for discourse on 
the nature and representation of knowledge. 
THE HISTORY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION: 
HOW MORAL IS THE STORY? 
Are special educators part of a moral story, doing good 
things for children and families? Or are we part of a story in 
which we, however unwittingly, bring harm to children with 
disabilities as a function of the roles we play and the cultural 
meaning of the story we are in? Or are we in a confused and 
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complex story, intending good, yet knowing that some special 
education policies can harm children? One can find in the pro-
fessional and popular literature alike an affirmative response to 
each question (Fuchs & Fuchs, 1995; Johnson, 1969). 
All of us would hope to be part of a moral story and cer-
tainly would affirm our intention to do good for children and 
their families. Special educators, after all, tend to be advo-
cates and defenders of the rights of children with disabili-
ties. The thought that we could participate in any way in 
anything harmful is appalling. Yet the narrative of special 
education suggests that we have, and that, in some ways, we 
still do. Although we do not participate by informed choice, 
the effects are the same. We will briefly describe selected 
issues in the modern history of special education and exam-
ples of tensions surrounding the nature of the story. 
Special education is viewed in different ways depending 
on the political and social context. Some have viewed it as 
a valued set of programs with an empirically validated 
knowledge base for practice (Carnine, 1991), meeting the 
unmet needs of children in school who otherwise would be 
unserved in the general education system (Kauffman & Hal-
lahan, 1995; Lieberman, 1992). Others have viewed special 
education as having served a purpose in the history of edu-
cation but now as defeating the social egalitarian goals of 
education by keeping some students away from their age 
peers and the general education curriculum (Gartner & Lip-
sky, 1987; Pugach & Warger, 1996). Still others have been 
more harsh, damning it as a racist bureaucracy, stigmatizing 
and segregating African American boys, and violating the 
rights of children (Granger & Granger, 1986; Grossman 
1998; Johnson 1969)-and ineffective at best (Van Doninck, 
1983). So what is special education 's story? 
Special education is a morally and politically complex 
area of professional education, colored by both heroic 
advances and, however unintended, shameful misdeeds. 
Those involved in the advances as well as those involved in 
the misdeeds-in reality, many are involved in both-did 
not necessarily appreciate the moral story they were in at the 
time. The point here is not to denigrate the field of special 
education. Its critics have done that. Neither is it simply to 
tell the story of the good that special education has done and 
is doing. Leaders in the field have told that story many times 
and are continuing to tell it. Rather, our purpose here is to 
examine the moral complexity of the story and consider the 
value of retelling the story of the field in the contexts of dis-
courses on ethics, politics, and social science in the begin-
ning of the 21st century. A couple of examples will suffice 
to illustrate the moral tension in our history. 
The Example of Institutionalization 
One moment in time involves the institutionalization of 
individuals with mental illness and those with mental retar-
dation. Psychiatric hospitals and centers for people with 
developmental disabilities have a strong history of advo-
cates who were motivated by zeal and righteous indignation 
because of the lack of care for individuals with disabilities. 
The advocates were successful in gaining public support and 
developing institutions that later, in many instances, became 
monstrosities where people were abused and neglected in 
what came to be known as "snake pits" and "purgatory" 
(Blatt & Kaplan, 1966). 
As far as we know, the revolutionary leaders who built 
institutions were good people doing what they believed 
were good things for persons in need-those with disabili-
ties. When built, the institutions, improved the living cir-
cumstances of individuals with disabilities. Over time, how-
ever, they ran their course and fell apart both sociologically 
and morally (Lightner, 1999; Smith, 1995; Tomes, 1994). 
Improved by major reforms in the 1960s and 1970s, residen-
tial institutions continue to function today. Although the qual-
ity of care is controlled by strong accountability measures, 
their value as a system of care continues to be challenged by 
those who support community-based care (Coates, 1990). 
In our young democracy, seeking to address the diversity 
in the mass immigration into the United States at the begin-
ning of the 20th century, citizens differed philosophically 
and politically over how to care for individuals with disabil-
ities. The institution-builders promoted an ethic of care 
translated as decent accommodations and treatment in resi-
dential facilities. Other forces promoted the social Darwin-
ian perspective of Herbert Spencer, articulated so strongly in 
the United States by William Graham Sumner. They were 
less supportive of providing care for people with disabilities 
and more persuaded by the genetic perspective of nature 
knowing best and eliminating error in the process of evolu-
tion. They believed it unwise to invest economic resources 
in caring for those who are not able to thrive with typical 
care and potentially contribute to society as independent cit-
izens. Not until after the middle of the 20th century did soci-
ety begin to develop a more egalitarian ethic, as evidenced 
by the demise of eugenics boards and the development of 
national policies to reduce institutional dependency. These 
policies, reflecting a new vision of care and education, sup-
ported integrated community programs as alternatives to 
institutionalization, and inclusion in education as an alterna-
tive to pull-out programs. 
The advocacy initiatives on behalf of persons with dis-
abilities came, for the most part, from family members and 
friends with disabilities, and from professionals involved in 
medical, social, or educational services. Strong vocal and 
politically active disability constituencies were developed, 
and the social agenda of caregiving for persons with dis-
abilities struck a responsive moral chord. Ultimately, consti-
tutional arguments, especially the right to due process, 
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became pivotal in successful litigation and the development 
of law and public policy. What did not happen, however, and 
what has not yet happened in professionalized caregiving in 
general, is the articulation of the moral agenda of special 
education or other specialized caregiving systems, with the 
prevailing political theory. This issue is discussed later, in 
the section on liberal democracy. 
The Example of Educating Children With 
Mild Mental Retardation 
Another significant moment in the history of special edu-
cation came in 1968 when Lloyd Dunn, one of the leaders in 
the field of special education, commented on the ineffec-
tiveness of special education programs for children with 
mild mental retardation: 
I have been honored to be a past president of the Council for 
Exceptional Children. I have loyally supported and pro-
moted special classes for the educable mentally retarded for 
most of the last 20 years, but with growing disaffection. In 
my view, much of our past and present practices are morally 
and educationally wrong. We have been living at the mercy 
of general educators who have referred their problem chil-
dren to us. And we have been generally ill prepared and 
ineffective in educating these children. Let us stop being 
pressured into continuing and expanding a special education 
program that we know now to be undesirable for many of 
the children we are dedicated to serve. (Dunn, 1968, pp. 
5-21) 
Dunn implored professionals to be morally responsible 
for the failures: "The conscience of special educators needs 
to rub up against morality" (p. 19). By accepting "problem 
pupils" referred by teachers in general education class-
rooms, he argued, we enable these teachers to avoid dealing 
with individual differences. Emphasizing the moral culpa-
bility of special educators, Dunn added: 
We must face the reality-we are asked to take children oth-
ers cannot teach, and a large percentage of these are from 
ethnically and/or economically disadvantaged backgrounds. 
Thus, much of special education will continue to be a sham 
of dreams unless we immerse ourselves into the total envi-
ronment of our children from inadequate homes and back-
grounds and insist on a comprehensive ecological push-
with a quality educational program as part of it. (Dunn, 
1968, p. 20) 
Dunn's injunction, more than 30 years ago, that the con-
science of special educators should "rub against morality" 
presupposes a collective sense of the morality of the mission 
of special education. It also anchors the need for a moral dis-
course in special education. 
Viewed as a moral story, special education is a field in 
which "the good" intended by professionals is to improve 
the educational outcomes for children with disabilities. That 
commitment is manifested in implementing research-based 
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standards of practice and continuing to improve the knowl-
edge foundation for all interventions. Viewed from the per-
spective of character morality, special education has been 
tainted by insensitive and harmful practices such as racially 
biased assessments and placement policies. Also, cruel prac-
tices, such as subjecting persons with disabilities to substan-
dard conditions in institutions, group homes, and the like, 
and using harsh aversives such as electric shock and isola-
tion as methods to control behavior, have been part of the 
history of special education. 
Although these conditions certainly have improved over 
the last half of the 20th century, we always have known how 
to do better than we have done or are doing. Our practices 
never have been adequately guided by sound theory or fully 
informed by available research. Neither have they ade-
quately reflected our values. This seems a logical conclusion 
when, for example, empirically validated practices are not 
widely implemented (Kauffman, 1999.). 
We could list many reasons-such as local control of 
educational policies and the shortage of qualified special 
education teachers-for never quite reaching the mark, and 
these reasons may be valid. But tension between what we 
know and what we, as professional educators, researchers, 
and policymakers, are able to do will always exist. Differ-
ences between reasonable people about the nature of 
"approved" knowledge and the work to be done also will 
persist. A moral story for the field should include a valued 
and respected space for differences and openness to learn 
alternatives for keeping the tension productive, the voices 
respectful, and the discourses fair. 
As special educators, we are challenged to employ an 
ethical theory that is defensible in the diverse contexts of 
our work. Next we will examine character morality as a 
complement to choice morality-the philosophy of ethics 
most commonly discussed in special education-as a way to 
address ethical questions in the field. 
ETHICAL THEORIES 
It is very common to imagine ethics as a kind of moral cal-
culus for solving ethical dilemmas. All we need is the right 
formula and all of our problems can be resolved. It would be 
nice if it were really that simple. In the real world, however, 
life is complex, ambiguous, and often tragic-it does not 
readily yield to such a calculus. Ethics is not about being 
right as much as it is about being responsible. We must 
intend to discover what is right, but we can be mistaken and 
still be responsible. However, we can do this only if we are 
prepared to recognize both our own fallibility and our com-
mon humanity. (Fasching, 1997, p. 99) 
Choice Morality 
In addressing ethical dilemmas, the theory most familiar 
to special educators might be called "choice morality." In it, 
meaningful choice, and all it involves, is typically viewed as 
the cornerstone of responsibility. What we will call "choice 
moralists" (Kekes, 1990) maintain, or simply assume, that a 
person can be legitimately held morally responsible only for 
those things he or she did as a result of having chosen to do 
them. Meaningful choice implies freedom of action. 
Choices that cannot affect what the chooser actually does 
would be vacuous, certainly not meaningful choices. Free-
dom of action is generally taken to entail that the actor has 
a range of actions from which to choose and that the act of 
choice is crucial to the deeds the actor actually performs. 
This idea typically is referred to in the philosophical litera-
ture as the principle of alternate possibilities (Fischer, 
1986). The notion captured in the principle of alternate pos-
sibilities, that humans usually are free to do something other 
than what they actually do, is a metaphysical tenet, a cor-
nerstone, of most theories of moral responsibility. Whether 
it is consistent with the way responsibility is actually 
ascribed is a matter of much philosophical dispute (Frank-
furt, 1988.) 
Another tenet of choice morality directly related to the 
first is the principle that "ought" implies "can." If a person 
cannot do something, what sense does it make to say that he 
or she ought to do it? If it makes no sense to say that he or 
she ought to do it, how can it make sense to hold him or her 
responsible for not doing it? 
When these two tenets are conjoined, a picture of the 
basic requirements of holding someone morally responsible 
for his or her actions emerges. If one could not have chosen 
to do something other than what one did, it makes little or 
no sense either to say that one ought not to have done it or 
to hold him or her morally responsible for doing it. In the 
absence of the freedom to do other than what we do and the 
ability to choose a genuine alternative to the action we in 
fact perform, there seems to be no point to moral responsi-
bility and little point to moral principles and rules that direct 
us to do some things rather than others. 
Understood in this way, the foundations of choice moral-
ity appeal to many of our basic intuitions about accountabil-
ity and responsibility. There can be little doubt that deeply 
ingrained in our thinking about responsibility is its depen-
dence on, or assumption of, freedom of action. Little won-
der that meaningful choice has been so important an idea in 
moral philosophy and that moral theorists typically conceive 
of a "moral situation or dilemma" as one in which a person 
must make a difficult choice, fully aware of the efficacy of 
choice with respect to action and, hence, affecting outcomes 
in human relations for good or ill. 
A picture of the moral person in choice morality forms 
around a conception of what J.L. Austin called "the machin-
ery of action" (Austin, 1961). The action that will be evalu-
ated against moral standards may be envisioned as having 
many parts or stages. These include planning, appreciating, 
deliberating, choosing, intending, and, of course, actually 
executing the action. Deliberation leading to choice emerges 
as central to the picture of the way a moral person acts . The 
picture takes something like the following form: Our moral 
person finds himself or herself confronted with a problem in 
which various alternative actions are possible, and he or she 
deliberates about the problem by weighing the salient moral 
features of the situation and the results that choosing one 
possible action rather than another should have. He or she 
then applies some moral principle, rule, or "calculus" to the 
problem, thereby determining a morally acceptable action in 
the circumstances, decides to act accordingly, and so acts. 
On accounts like that suggested by Putnam (1978), the 
application of principles, rules, or a calculus stage may be 
replaced by nonlinear reasoning in the imagination of the 
moral person. Moral theorists-as different in other ways as 
Kantians and utilitarians-do share such a picture of the 
centrality of meaningful choice to moral responsibility and 
moral condemnation. Little wonder that so many moral the-
orists have struggled with the age-old problem of free will 
and determinism. If there is no way to make meaningful 
choice compatible with what appears to be the causal deter-
minism of the world in which we act, the very idea of moral 
responsibility is in severe jeopardy of losing any sense 
whatsoever. Or at least it is in the choice moralist's concep-
tion of responsibility. (For a radically different view, see 
Frankfurt, 1988, and Fischer, 1986). 
The idea that the freedom to meaningfully choose one's 
actions is the crucial element of moral responsibility pro-
motes the idea that the capacity to choose is the identifying 
feature of moral agents, the subjects of morality and ethics. 
Some choice moralists maintain that, if someone is a moral 
agent by virtue of his or her ability to make meaningful 
choices, then all moral agents must have equal moral worth 
because they all evidence that capacity of choice with respect 
to their actions. These philosophers, then, are worth egali-
tarians. They maintain that moral worth is the baseline of 
moral personhood, the recognition of the intrinsic value of 
moral agents. It is quite distinct from moral merit, which is 
the gauge of whether a moral agent is a good or a bad person. 
For many choice moralists, such as Immanuel Kant and 
John Rawls, the moral worth of a person is in no way related 
to what that person morally deserves or merits because of 
his or her behavior. Insofar as moral agents are understood 
to possess equal moral worth, they are to be treated with 
equal respect and should have an equal right to pursue their 
individual conceptions of the good. 
Kant (1969) encapsulates that idea in his second formu-
lation of the categorical imperative: "Act so that you treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, 
always as an end and never as a means only" (Kant, 1969, 
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p. 54). This is a basic statement of worth egalitarianism. It 
entails that though people may act in ways that raise or 
lower their moral merit, they always must be treated with 
respect, as ends. No matter how bad their actions have been, 
there are things that must never be done to them. For exam-
ple, we may not inflict "unnecessary pain" (to use Nod-
dings', 1992, term) on them. What makes the inflicting of 
pain on a person necessary is, however, a major and unset-
tled question that should, and does, trouble serious choice 
moralists (French, 2001). 
Choice Morality and Educational Policy 
Several authors writing about educational policy and 
ethics have emphasized the value of principle-based ethics 
(Howe & Miramontes, 1992), or what we are calling choice 
morality. Howe and Miramontes ( 1992) have written an 
important and influential text in which they distinguish 
between principle-based and virtue-based theories in their 
discussion of the ethics of special education They include a 
description of the process of ethical deliberation and special 
education-oriented cases. Noddings ( 1984, 1992), on the 
other hand, has provided strong arguments for employing 
an ethic of care in the adjudication of competing moral 
interests. 
Dokecki & Zaner ( 1986 ) addressed ethical issues in the 
.field of mental retardation. Paul, Gallagher, Kendricks, 
Thomas, and Young (1992) examined ethical issues in policy 
development in developmental disabilities and, in another 
work (Paul et al. , 1997), ethical decision-making in local 
schools. These are concerned predominantly with moral 
choices. 
Several other texts on education ethics, written during the 
past decade, have particular relevance for special education. 
Nash's (1996) work on "real world ethics" includes a useful 
perspective and approach to ethical analysis. Starratt (1994) 
provides an insightful discussion of building ethical schools 
that offers guidance for those who are willing to consider the 
moral culture in a school when thinking about the inclus~on 
of children with disabilities in general education classrooms. 
We will not attempt to summarize these or other works, or 
to extend the arguments for choice morality. The appeal of 
choice morality to many of our basic intuitions about moral 
responsibility is evident and powerful. Within the choice 
moralist's conception of ethics, the role of the ethical educa-
tor is to make, and to prepare students to make, morally per-
missible choices while understanding and protecting individ-
ual interests. Ascriptions of moral responsibility rest on the 
determination that actions are freely chosen. Skill in choos-
ing from the moral point of view when operating one's 
machinery of action is the condition for moral agency and is 
the primary goal of moral education from this perspective. 
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Character Morality 
There are, however, ways other than choice-based theo-
ries to conceive of morality, and these suggest rather differ-
ent and fundamental implications for special education. The 
intuitions about responsibility and moral accountability to 
which they appeal are radically different from those that 
make choice morality attractive. One such alternative theory 
has been called "character morality" (see Kekes, 1990). 
Character morality, however, should not be confused with 
the character education movement currently popular in edu-
cation. Most of the character education programs currently 
touted in K-12 circles are versions of applied choice moral-
ity. Their models are deliberative, dominated by the concep-
tion of the moral person as meaningful chooser over a range 
of possible actions. 
Nor does character morality, as we will use the term, 
exhaust what is called virtue ethics. Many, if not most, of the 
recent virtue theorists are choice moralists. They are distinct 
from the traditional choice moralists in adopting concepts 
such as care as more basic than, for example, justice, and in 
eschewing the central role of rules and principles in moral 
deliberation that typically are found in choice theories. But 
choice still occupies the key position in their accounts. 
As we will use the term, character morali sts (for exam-
ple, John Kekes) begin to examine the moral situation at 
quite a different place than the choice moralists do. Charac-
ter moralists claim to be looking at how humans actually 
behave and the results of that behavior rather than con-
structing linear deliberation/decision models. They maintain 
that observation of humans reveals that most human behav-
ior is not chosen deliberatively. Rather, it is habitual or the 
result of ingrained character traits that were not solely, if at 
all, formed by conscious choices. They note that character 
traits may, and typically do, have roots in culture, tradition, 
training, custom, ritual, convention, routine, and folklore. 
Character moralists will tell us that people, more often than 
not act "in character." What they then do, whether good or 
evil, may not be the result of their choices. It is just what 
they do. To try to fit the pattern of their actions into deliber-
ative linear models ( or even nonlinear imagination models 
such as Putnam, 1978, suggests) may miss the mark by a 
rather wide margin in a vast majority of cases. 
Fm1her, in a realistic sense, when acting in character, 
people might not have genuine alternative possibilities of 
action in many, possibly most, circumstances. When hearing 
such a suggestion, choice moralists may well argue that it is 
always at least logically possible for people to choose to act 
in ways other than they do when they act in character. There 
is always a possible world in which the person could have 
made a choice different from the one he or she actually 
made. 
The character moralist may grant that this is true. But 
when viewed realistically, the character moralist argues, the 
possible world may be so remote from the real world that to 
hang a judgment of moral responsibility on it must seem 
highly suspect to most ordinary folks. It has the look of a des-
perate move to save a theory in the face of the facts. When we 
say that someone really could not have done otherwise under 
the circumstances, we generally don't mean that it is logically 
impossible that he or she could not have done something else. 
We might well mean that it would take quite a different per-
son to behave differently or even to have considered alterna-
tive possibilities of action in the circumstances. 
Choice moralists, following in the footsteps of Aristotle, 
might argue alternatively that a person's character traits are 
the result of previous conscious choices the person has 
made, and that the person, by virtue of a causal chain back 
to those choices, should be held responsible for his or her 
character and the actions that result from it even though 
those actions at the time are not directly the result of a 
choice. 
Character moralists will respond that only some, perhaps 
a rather small portion, of a person's character traits may 
have been developed by the choice method. The others, the 
great majority, are the result of what Kekes calls "uncon-
scious habituation." There is nothing reflective or delibera-
tive about the acquisition process. 
Character Moralists Versus Choice Moralists 
Though not a character moralist, Barbara Herman (2000) 
has expressed views with which the character moralists can 
agree. She writes: 
For morality to perform its central function of securing rou-
tine action, moral concepts and features of character need to 
be acquired in the ongoing process of moral education so 
that a morally literate agent is able to recognize and respond 
to what is morally salient in the routine circumstances she 
encounters .... This is , for the most part, nondeliberative. 
Like the spatially competent agent 's ability to move through 
ordinary doorways without performing any geometric cal-
culations, morally literate agents move among persons with-
out the need to think whether they should or could shove 
them aside, use their body parts for this or that good cause, 
or tell the truth when asked for the time of day. (Herman, 
2000, p. 31) 
To grasp a crucial difference between choice and charac-
ter moralists, it is instructive to think of people whose 
morally indefensible characters were formed and nurtured in 
cultures imbued with racial, cultural, and other forms of big-
otry. As examples, think of white American Southerners 
during the slavery period, KKK members and other white 
racists, witch hunters in Europe and America in the 17th 
century, medieval crusaders, ethnic-cleansing Serbs, Ger-
man Nazis, and a wide variety of others who have been 
raised in cultures of hate, bigotry, intolerance, and fanati-
cism. These examples, of course, are radical, and not subtle. 
Other examples may be more subtle but no less unsavory. 
Suppose we grant with the character moralist that such peo-
ple, or at least the vast majority of them, probably do not 
choose to be racial and ethnic bigots. Their preferences, and 
so their characters, are not, or are not fully or at least with 
respect to their bigotry, matters of choice. And they do not 
typically deliberate about what they are doing when their 
actions display those characters, when they, acting in char-
acter, do terrible things to other human beings. Shouldn't 
they be held responsible for the harm they cause? Choice 
moralists-unless they deny the basic premise that the char-
acters of such people were not the result of conscious or 
meaningful choices those people made, that their evil 
actions "follow from their unchosen vices, ... are sympto-
matic of enduring dispositions, and ... occur when they act 
naturally and spontaneously, in accordance with vices they 
have developed but without choosing to develop them" 
(Kekes, 1990, p. 66)-should not hold them morally respon-
sible for their bigoted characters and their actions that 
express their characters. But character moralists will hold 
them responsible for those actions despite evidence that they 
were unchosen, that their actions were the byproduct of their 
characters (see Kekes, 1990, p. 70). 
This is not the forum to explore how people come to have 
morally perverse characters. We suspect that they adopt 
them unconsciously because they grow up in prejudiced, 
intolerant, and bigoted communities where the vast majority 
of the members, including those in positions of authority, 
regularly express and act on a singular set of pernicious 
views. Certainly, in such an environment the consideration 
of questions about the veracity and the morality of the dom-
inant views can be virtually unthinkable for most commu-
nity members. It takes a special person with uncommon 
insight to raise the appropriate moral concerns. 
It also is likely that the members of these communities do 
not have actual opportunities to alter the course of their 
character development, "since doing so would have required 
of them a sustained effort to act contrary to their own pre-
dispositions and to the social context that favored their 
development in a particular direction" (Kekes, 1990, p. 75). 
The very virtues that might have stood them in good moral 
stead and withstood the pressures of their culture are exactly 
the ones that they lack because they never were encouraged 
or trained in them. Their cultures, their upbringings, are 
inhospitable to the sort of critical reflection that might 
encourage them to question the inbred and ingrained prefer-
ences they have, to examine an.a adopt better moral prefer-
ences. Their personal and social identities, as well as their 
self-appraisals and those they make of others, are grounded 
in those preferences. But still, even in the face of such an 
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account, our moral intuitions counsel holding such people 
responsible for the harm they cause, the undeserved pain they 
inflict, choice or no choice. Character moralists build their 
theories on those intuitions, on the contention that the pri-
mary task of morality is to minimize the evil that people do 
to each other, regardless of whether the perpetrators chose it. 
Kekes (1990) writes: "Character morality ... requires 
both curbing evil, which makes good lives possible, and the 
pursuit of good, which gives good lives their content" (p. 
145). If the only evil that can be attacked legitimately by 
moral principles is that which results from meaningful 
choices of moral agents, because that is the only evil for 
which people can be held responsible, morality wil1 be vir-
tually impotent in responding to its primary task. Most of 
the undeserved harm inflicted on people by those acting in 
character (Kekes calls it "unchosen evil") will lie outside of 
the boundaries of moral responsibility. Character morality 
attempts to bring the control of evil-producing characters 
under the authority of morality. 
To do that, the character moralist must deny that the prin-
ciple that "ought" implies "can" is the unassailable base of 
moral responsibility. The character moralist also attacks the 
worth-egalitarianism of choice morality. Desert-that is, 
what is deserved-not worth, character moralists argue, 
should govern our moral evaluations of people and their 
actions. For them, people are not equal with respect to their 
moral worth. Moral worth is a function of moral merit. The 
ideal of character morality is that people ought to get what 
they deserve and desert depends on moral merit, and that 
depends on what people actually do, not on the capacities 
they are presumed to possess. We may gain or lose moral 
merit (a point on which the choice and character moralists 
agree). But, for the character moralist, moral merit and 
moral worth are identical. Consequently, restraints on the 
treatment of persons do not necessarily apply across the 
human board. Those lacking in moral merit because of their 
behavior do not deserve to be treated as having moral worth 
equal to those who behave meritoriously. 
These tenets of character morality support its contention 
that people who perform evil deeds still might be held 
morally accountable if their harm-causing behavior is the 
result of inculcated character traits. Character traits, though 
not the result of linear deliberative processes, that evidence 
themselves in inflicting undeserved harm on people are seri-
ous moral flaws. The raison d'etre of morality must be to 
identify and address such flaws, which involves holding peo-
ple responsible for what they do, seeing that people get what 
they deserve, what they merit because of their behavior, and 
trying to effect changes in character so that people may resist 
whatever evil dispositions they have during their interactions 
with others. Doing so may or may not involve developing 
deliberative skills, but, in any case, outcome is what matters. 
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Perhaps the most basic difference between choice and 
character morality is that the character moralist maintains 
that our moral merit depends on the amount of evil we cause 
and not on whether we chose to do the things that caused the 
evil. Insofar as our characters and our circumstances are typ-
ically different, we do not have the same moral merit. Fur-
ther, because the character moralist equates moral merit 
with moral worth, we do not all have the same moral worth. 
Consequently, we do not all deserve the same things. If 
social institutions are going to minimize evil and contribute 
to flourishing of the conditions in which good lives can be 
lived, they must be structured so the inequality of desert is 
acknowledged and becomes a fundamental principle of the 
distribution of goods. 
Simply, the character moralist maintains, things ought to 
be arranged so that everyone gets what he or she deserves. 
The world we inhabit, however, is not so arranged. Good 
people suffer and wicked people prosper. Character moral-
ists take that to be indisputable evidence that we must bring 
moral order to our lives and our institutions. Human institu-
tions should be constructed so that they are more likely to 
discourage the development of bad character traits , espe-
cially those productive of undeserved harm, and so that peo-
ple will get what they are due-that the good are rewarded 
and the wicked punished. 
To achieve this, those institutions-of which education is 
arguably the most important-must concentrate on not 
encouraging evil character development and on positively 
altering the traits of those who evidence bad moral charac-
ters. The social engineering problem of forming institutions 
that will achieve the ends of character morality is its major 
challenge. 
One difference between the choice moralist 's perspective 
on the role of education and that of the character moralist is 
that the former sees education as preparing students to make 
choices without reference to the content of those choices. 
The choice moralist sees education as preparing students to 
make choices that will be consistent with their achieving 
their individual conceptions of the good, regardless of what 
those conceptions may be. These typically are referred to as 
informed or "educated" choices. The character moralist is 
more concerned with the development of traits of character 
compatible with maintaining a community that minimizes 
inflicting undeserved harm, and, if the character moralist is 
also a communitarian democrat, promulgates a shared con-
ception of the good and informs the habits of behavior of the 
citizens. 
Although it is not clear what sorts of regimens are 
morally permissible in character inculcation, a character 
moralist likely would be willing to sanction a wider selec-
tion of techniques than a choice moralist would. Inflicting 
unwarranted pain, of course, would not be allowed, but the 
character education process in the classroom would have to 
mirror, in some large measure, the inculcation processes 
outside the classroom that incubate the character traits being 
combated. Most of those are assimilated outside of a hnear 
deliberative process. They are picked up through experience 
in a social climate that is hospitable to them and inhos-
pitable to other traits. The task of the character moralist as 
educator is to create and sustain an environment that 
rewards morally appropriate character traits and is unconge-
nial to morally unacceptable ones, while not assuming that 
choice, or even the capacity to choose, underlies character 
and character development. 
Although character morality and choice morality have 
been separated in the present discussion, so as to examine 
issues in special education, ethicists recognize the risk of 
overdrawing the distinction. Similarly, most experienced 
educators recognize the risk of overdrawing the distinction 
between character and choice when discussing the goals of 
teaching, counseling, or therapy. Although interventions 
focusing on helping students make better choices certainly 
have been far more efficacious than attempts to change char-
acter, the issue here is not the goal of interventions but, 
rather, the moralities of education and care. The negative 
outcome data on changing character come more from clini-
cal literature in studies of psychopathology than studies of 
character formation and education. 
SPECIAL EDUCATION AND CHARACTER: 
SELECTED ISSUES 
Leading humanistic special educators and psychologists 
in the 20th century focused on character morality as well as 
choice morality. Fritz Redl talked about "massaging numb 
values." Bill Morse similarly argued that special education 
teachers must be able to care effectively about their stu-
dents. Nicholas Hobbs wrote eloquently about the require-
ment that teachers of "disturbed children" be decent adults, 
able to nurture children. Teachers are models-moral as 
well as academic~ Modeling is important in developing char-
acter, and the teacher as a model is part of a larger social 
ecology within which other models influence the develop-
ment of character in a student's life. 
Teacher Qualities 
The education of teachers has not substantially addressed 
the issue of the nonacademic qualities required of teachers. 
It is difficult to address because we do not have adequate 
ways of thinking about counseling adults out of teacher edu-
cation when we believe, based on their participation in our 
classes and in internships, that they would not be good mod-
els for children. Our approach at the University of South 
Florida is to assign beginning teacher education students to 
small cohorts and to have faculty members and doctoral stu-
dents follow those students throughout their program and 
into their first year of teaching. The cohorts meet 1 hour 
weekly and focus on self, diversity, ethics, and teaching in 
successive semesters. 
An important reason for putting these cohorts together in 
this way is to get to know the students very well from the 
beginning of their training and to provide guidance to all, 
including those who need another career. This is done in a 
time-intensive interpersonal context with safeguards built in 
to minimize error in counseling students out of the program. 
Judgment is, of course, involved; no part of education is 
amoral. Teacher character and values matter. The teachers 
who graduate from our program will be judging their stu-
dents every day. This is not science. It is the activity of an 
ethics-conscious community of teacher educators, admit-
tedly political, attempting to negotiate among critical moral 
issues and interests. 
Teacher Education Curricula and Texts 
Academic subjects hold center stage in discussions of the 
school reform agenda; not character education. Behavior, as 
forecast by Dunn, has tended to hold center stage in special 
education. In part, the absence of substantial attention to 
ethics in special education is the result of the complexity of 
the issues. It is also a consequence of the fact that ethics is 
not a specific and value~ part of the teacher education cur-
riculum or of the doctoral curriculum. 
Neither general special education nor specific disability-
focused textbooks typically address ethics or morality 
directly. In the area of behavior disorders, the prevailing 
narratives have been psychodynamic, behavioral, neuropsy-
chological, ecological, or sociological. Behavior is inter-
preted within these narratives or theories. Professionals are 
trained and most comfortable thinking, working, and talking 
within such a conceptual and linguistic context. 
Ethics, on the other hand, is more difficult. Perhaps this 
accounts, at least in part, for the absence of discussion of 
morality in special education and why these discussions typ-
ically end with a tacit acceptance of relativism. And the dis-
cussion of moral responsibility has tended to focus on the 
ways in which individuals are less than responsible for their 
behavior because of pathology, social circumstances, or 
defeating habits. In discussing ethics and morality, we are 
cautious for fear of moralizing and passing judgment. Yet, 
the presumption that those who teach children ought to 
adopt an amoral stance is untenable. 
The development and reinforcement of character traits or 
virtues ought not to be factored out of a special education 
program. In fact, it might be crucial to success in the field. 
The behavior we would change in a student has meaning in 
his or her moral construction of self and others. The question 
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is not whether special educators are involved in character 
education; it is whether there is awareness of that involve-
ment and willingness to make character education an 
explicit part of the curriculum. 
Another aspect of the issue of character morality has to 
do with the culture of the classroom and the school. Starratt 
( 1994) has described the process of building an ethical 
school. Discussions of full inclusion, as opposed to pull-out 
programs, could go differently if they were cast in the con-
text of an ethical school, one in which ethical qualities of 
character and place were addressed directly in building and 
nurturing a caring and learning school culture. 
There is, however, a rather serious block to the success of 
a character morality-based educational approach. There is a 
tension in contemporary Western societies between the way 
the social/political process operates actually and theoreti-
cally and the social climate that character moralists seem 
inclined to favor. 
DEMOCRACY AND SPECIAL EDUCATION 
Schools prepare students to participate in a democracy 
and make informed decisions that affect themselves and 
people in their community. In our current system of liberal 
democracy, decisions generally are made based on the will 
of the majority with the understanding that there is no priv-
ileged conception of the good. Within such a system, special 
education asks for an exception to accommodate the indi-
vidual needs of the minority of children who bear special 
education labels, including those who may be incapable of 
effectively representing their own interests. Needless to say, 
this position produces ethical dilemmas including the ques-
tions: "Who speaks for this minority?" "How can the inter-
ests of special education students and their families best be 
negotiated in our schools and communities?" "How much 
can we expect the majority to concede in accommodating 
this minority?" 
The Western philosophical tradition, reflecting the cur-
rent dichotomy of conceptions, has two rather different sto-
ries about 9emocracy: liberalism and comm unitarianism ( or 
Athenian-style democracy). 
Athenian Model 
The Athenian (communitarian) model is what Barber 
( 1994) calls a "strong democracy," whereas the liberal demo-
cratic conception requires a rather "thin" democratic politi-
cal structure. Athenian-style democracy is conceptually thick, 
building political order and structure out of the very mean-
ing of the term "democracy." It is radically participatory for 
those who are considered citizens. Government is carried on 
through institutions designed to facilitate civic participation 
in agenda-setting, deliberation, and implementation of 
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policy. The Athenian model is characterized by the transfor-
mation of multiple individual conceptions of the good into a 
commonly held, and rather singular, communal conception 
of the good toward whose achievement and/or maintenance 
political processes are directed. 
The Athenian conception derives its strength from the 
fact that the citizens' individual interests are seen to orbit 
around their shared conception of the good, tending by 
exclusion to produce a homogeneous population. In the 
Athenian-style democracy, citizens in the participatory 
process of governing formulate the public ends toward 
which their community strives and thereby defines itself. 
Communitarian democracy amateurizes politics and gov-
ernment, creating a community out of a collective. That com-
munity transforms the individual while it sustains itself. It 
educates its citizens to become effective public participants 
and to appreciate and adopt its values, its shared vision and 
purpose. Sustaining the "strong" democracy requires nurtur-
ing an abiding sense of civic responsibility in the members, 
developed through training in the arts of citizenship. 
Liberal Democrat Model 
Other than sharing some of the basic descriptive termi-
nology of democracy, the Athenian communitarian democ-
ratic ideal has little in common with the liberal democrat 
conception that has dominated the political scene in the 
West for the past three or four centuries. The liberal democ-
rat's roots are planted firmly in the individualism that has 
marked political philosophy in the West since at least the 
17th century. Liberal democracy embraces individual auton-
omy, and its political stance is the politic of individual inter-
ests and interest groups composed of individuals. The liberal 
democratic process, thus, is an adversarial encounter of fac-
tions, individuals associated into loosely confederated 
groups that generally are united only with respect to a single 
issue, likely with quite distinct conceptions of the good, col-
lectively and individually, each seeking majority support. Its 
basic conception of government is that of decision making 
between competing points of view. Though it may seek con-
sensus, the liberal democratic process is not interested in the 
formative project of citizenship. It radically disassociates 
the public from the private sphere. 
The liberal democrat conceives of the decision-whether 
it be made by the single voter in the booth choosing among 
a list of candidates or casting a vote as a representative in the 
halls of the legislature-as the heart and soul of the political 
process. The vote is what matters, not the discussion of the 
issue. The majority rules, and its rule is not constrained with 
respect to the outcomes to be reached, except that it cannot 
infringe upon the constitutionally established political free-
doms of its citizens. 
This view of liberal democracy, however, generates a para-
dox, as Gutmann (1993) notes, "in the tension between the 
popular will and the conditions of maintaining the popular 
will over time." A liberal democrat should oppose any deci-
sion of the majority that restricts any of the basic liberties 
because it would not be democratic to restrict those freedoms, 
but the same liberal democrat should support the majority's 
decision because not doing so would be undemocratic. 
What, then, should the liberal democrat do if the major-
ity votes, for example, to restrict the freedom to practice 
religion by excluding from protection any religion that for-
bids its practitioners from seeking medical treatment for 
their ill children? So liberal democrats can discover them-
selves trapped in their own rhetoric once they start using 
theoretical stratagems to salvage majority rule from its illib-
eral and undemocratic tendencies. 
Communitarian democracy is deliberation-oriented, and 
the deliberation is about how the social world, the commu-
nity, is to be formed and sustained. It is, crucially, involved 
in persuasion and the critical examination of options . It is 
what Barry" (1965) calls "decision by discussion of merits." 
It leads, of course, to the vote, but the vote is not the be-all 
and end-all of the democratic process, though it embodies 
the sense of urgency that marks the process as political. 
Choice-oriented liberal democrats who see the political 
process as combat between various individual and group 
preferences can only stave off what could easily become an 
"anarchy of adversary politics" with the principle of major-
ity rule, despite its potential paradoxes. "Majoritarianism," 
Barber(] 994) bemoans, "is a tribute to the failure of democ-
racy." That is not really accurate. It is the failure of commu-
nitarian democracy to sustain itself in the modern world. It 
is not the failure of liberal democracy, which is prepared to 
live with the paradoxes in the name of getting to closure on 
an issue. 
The foundations of liberal democracy are built on the the-
ory of rational choice. Independent rational preference 
based on one's conception of one's own best interests drives 
the political and the economic theory. Political arrangements 
and choices are the result of aggregated individual choices. 
Compromise-sometimes called the art of politics-is typi-
cally understood as the Pareto optimal choice when one can-
not maximize one's preferences, where preferences and 
their orderings are prepolitical and independent of commu-
nal relationships and commitments, even unchosen commit-
ments such as those embedded in culture and heritage. The 
need for compromise arises, of course, when conflicts of 
interests arise in the social world. Such conflicts are bar-
gainable, but they do not disappear in the compromise. They 
are set aside as the competing individuals or groups settle 
for something less than the realization of their interests in 
total. 
The communitarian democrat requires that citizens 
develop and practice conversational techniques that allow 
the forging of a common vision and a plan of action for the 
community. These techniques are not conducive to a plural-
istic or diverse citizenry. But that is exactly the sort of citi-
zenry that dominates modern Western democracies. Rather 
narrow bands of conversational proficiency are typical of 
people in the contemporary world, and that works against 
anything like the communitarian's common vision-oriented 
ideal. 
The communitarian ideal of democracy is, first and fore-
most, a story of place, a narrative of a people in a place. 
Commitment to that narrative drives the communal con-
science to sustain the institutions of self-government. No 
such narrative is possible in the pluralistic social world of 
contemporary Western democracies such as the United 
States. That is not to say that we have no stories or that we 
have no sense of place. Rather, with the help and urging of 
the liberal democrat, we have come to the realization, 
though probably regretfully, that it is impossible to compose 
a single coherent narrative that, for most of the people, 
would make interpretive sense of their current conditions, 
explain their commonality, and bring order and a sense of 
place to their lives. The story of America has far too many 
strands for the communitarian storyteller to weave a coher-
ent communal identity that would provide the exemplar for 
the formative project of communitarian democracy. The lib-
eral conception of procedural democracy, on the other hand, 
requires little by way of narrative, but it has a propensity to 
morph into a Kafkaesque bureaucracy. 
Relevance to Special Education 
For special education, the issues of ethics and political 
theory are especially important because children with dis-
abilities are a minority. The interests of children are always 
juxtaposed with majority interests. Principles supporting the 
allocation of disproportionate resources and the view that 
individual needs rather than equality should drive educa-
tional policy are ethical matters. The political process sus-
taining the interests of children with disabilities in federal 
policy is dynamic, and moral perspectives are transient. 
Attempts in 1980 and 1981 to reduce federal responsibility 
by not fully funding PL 94-142 is a vivid example. 
In a classic study of the American character, Bellah and 
his colleagues ( 1985) described the tension between the 
focus on individuals and the focus on the community. The 
scales are tipped, they found, clearly in the direction of indi-
vidualism. The deep tradition of liberal democracy with its 
emphasis on individualism, privacy, and rational choice 
does not fit the communitarian image we typically conjure 
up when thinking about the "disability community" and the 
special needs of minorities , including those with disabilities. 
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The ethical implications of the tension between liberal 
democratic and communitarian political theories are impor-
tant for special education. The moral defense of inclusion 
depends in part on the vision we have for the society we 
hope to be and the purpose of education in supporting that 
vision. The debates we have about the relative efficacy of 
various service delivery systems in meeting the needs of 
children with disabilities in schools are important. The argu-
ment that we should not harm children by denying them the 
best education we know how to provide is sound. It becomes 
more complicated, however, when we are forced to think in 
a finite fiscal context and the issue is the relative harm dis-
tributed among all children. It also is complicated by the 
kinds of data used to . make the efficacy argument. We will 
explore some aspects of that is ue next. 
ETHICAL DILEMMAS IN KNOWLEDGE 
AND REPRESENTATION 
One obvious response to whether children with disabili-
ties are better served in special education programs or not is: 
What do the data show? The empirical case has been 
debated pro and con (Danforth, 1997; Fuchs & Fuchs, 1995; 
Carnine, 1991; Gartner & Lipsky, 1987; Stainback & Stain-
back, 1992; Kauffman, 1999). Although the empirical 
response is necessarily part of an answer, it is far from suf-
ficient. One has to be concerned about the outcomes to be 
considered in assessing the success of the program. How 
does the program impact children's lives? Are the social 
costs less than the gains for the children served? 
Although considerable strides have been made in empir-
ically validating practices (Carnine, 1991), how to imple-
ment those practices in local contexts and how to specify 
meaningful dependent variables continue to challenge 
researchers in special education. The psychological models 
driving the specification of variables and the positivist epis-
temology of most of the research in special education have 
not led researchers into investigations, for example, of 
ethics and curriculum, ethics and teaching, or the develop-
ment of mmal community. 
The Debate 
This is a complex area of thought. Controversy surrounds 
claims and counter-claims about the nature and privileging 
of knowledge. Arguments center on different philosophies 
of science, with positivism being the traditional and still pre-
vailing paradigm of the mainstream research community in 
special education, and the politics of knowledge, again with 
claims and counter-claims about the use or abuse of power 
in privileging a perspective. The context of this debate has 
changed dramatically during the past three decades. Differ-
ent kinds of questions are being raised now, including not 
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just what we know but also how we know it (Gallagher, 
1998). 
Do local school cultures and teachers vary so widely that 
generalizable interventions or procedures are unrealistic? 
Can an adequate account of a child's success in school be 
given in objective terms, or is it so embedded in experience 
and culture that only narrative accounts are meaningful? 
These and other epistemological questions have been raised 
in limited ways within special education over the past 
decade (Danforth, 1995; Gallagher, 1998; Kauffman, 1999; 
Reid, Robinson, & Bunsen, 1995) and debates have been 
difficult and, at times, even rancorous. Those defending 
more traditional positivist understandings are concerned 
about relativism and the practical implications of nonposi-
tivist epistemologies for teaching children with disabilities 
(Kauffman, 1999; Sasso, 2001) . 
The Research 
Those challenging pos1t1v1st pos1t1ons have different 
epistemological views as well as concerns about the control 
and limitations that journal editors are placing on scholarly 
debate and resistance of federal funding agencies to support 
nonpositivist research. 
The tension between views that seek to keep the faith 
with established epistemological traditions and those that 
seek a more pluralistic discourse about knowledge is 
reflected in contrasting statements about editorial policies in 
Behavior Disorders and Mental Retardation. Kauffman and 
Brigham (1999), editors of Behavior Disorders, wrote: 
Our conceptual orientation, like that of our predecessors, is 
scientific and positivistic. We believe this orientation best 
serves not only the profession but also the children and fam-
ilies for whom we advocate .... We will ... do our utmost 
to discriminate legitimate from nonlegitimate claims to 
knowledge .... In our view, the field will progress most 
assured ly (and we believe that progress is both possible and 
desirable) by noting how scientific understanding is built by 
the slow, often painstaking accretion of reliable and replica-
ble findings, often beginning with the homeliest of topics 
and questions. 
Taylor (2000), editor of Mental Retardation, wrote: 
The role of journal editors in our field is not to silence new 
voices-or theories, methodologies, and modes of exposi-
tion, for that matter-but to allow opportunities for reasoned 
argument, discussion, and debate. If, indeed, we can believe 
in progress, this is how it can occur. 
The sociology and politics of knowledge are well illus-
trated by the contrast of these two editorial policies. We are 
not suggesting that either position is unethical. Rather, we are 
raising the question about hO\v best to construct ethical argu-
ments about the control of knowledge. Each position is stated 
in good faith and predicated on different understandings of 
knowledge. Critical theorists worry about the privileging of 
the positivist voice in the Behavior Disorders policy. Posi-
tivists may worry about the quality, and even the legitimacy, 
of the view of knowledge reflected in the Mental Retarda-
tion policy. 
Extensive literature on epistemology in the social sci-
ences has appeared during the last two decades. The differ-
ences between policy positions of the editors of Behavior 
Disorders and the editors of Mental Retardation reflect dif-
ferences found in that literature. 
In our view, the adversarial debates in special education 
have not been so much about epistemological issues such as 
objectivity or the existence of an observer-independent real-
ity-although these are points of disagreement-but, rather, 
of the rights of ideologically minority voices. The tensions 
are about control and fairness in the exercise of professional 
duties of editors in the illustrations provided here. We do not 
have legitimate ways to adjudicate these issues, and serious 
differences have emerged among good people. This is not a 
problem only in special education. It is a problem in the 
multiple discourse communities in the social sciences where 
the politics of voice transcend disciplinary boundaries. 
Epistemological Racism 
Notwithstanding the strong convictions about epistemol-
ogy held by different members of the professional special 
education community, the issues cut deep into the conversa-
tion about the ethical defense of philosophies of research. 
Scheurich & Young (1997) reference scholars of color (Banks, 
1993, 1995; Gordon, Miller, & Rollock, 1990; Stanfield, 
1985, 1993, 1994) who have suggested that the "modern" 
epistemologies used in educational research-positivism, 
postpositivism, neorealism, interpretivism, constructivism, 
critical theory, and postmodernism/poststructuralism-may 
be racially biased. They have argued that epistemologies, 
not our use of them, are racist. They point out that episte-
mological debates focus on issues such as quantitative ver-
sus qualitative research (e.g., Cizek, 1995), oqjectivity ver-
sus subjectivity (e.g. Heshusius, 1994), validity (e.g., Lenzo, 
1995; Moss, 1994), or paradigmatic issues in general (e.g. 
Bereiter, 1994; Delandshere & Petrosky, 1994; Gage, 1989) 
but they do not address the issue of race. Scheurich and 
Young (1997) argue that the lack of response to the charge 
of epistemological racism is a function of researchers' not 
understanding "how race is a critically significant epistemo-
logical problem in educational research" (p. 4). 
Although this is a significant problem in social science 
research in general, the issue has particular relevance to spe-
cial education, where the story has included racist practices 
in the assessment and placement of children with disabili-
ties. Claims of objectivity do not remove researchers from 
culpability. The research knowledge base for practice is no 
better than the moral integrity of the research enterprise. The 
implication of epistemological racism-the lack of attention 
to race in our understanding of know ledge and knowing-
has profound ethical implications in special education, where 
African American males are placed disproportionately in 
special education programs. To the extent that the social sci-
ence tools we use to know and to legitimize our knowledge 
are insensitive to race, we may have institutionalized a sys-
tematic negation of legitimate interests of minorities. 
The Practice of Special Education 
Working in an applied area, special educators are inter-
ested in understanding the needs and improving the lives of 
children with disabilities. As in general education, there is 
more interest in established and, as much as possible, empir-
ically validated practices-what to do and how to do it-
than in philosophical deliberations about the moral justifica-
tions for practice. Professional preparation programs at all 
levels, typically, give relatively little attention to moral 
foundations of practice. 
The same is true in graduate education, whether in edu-
cating teachers or researchers. The focus in training 
researchers, for example, is on methods of inquiry, with lit-
tle or no attention given to the epistemological foundations 
of research or the ethics, politics, or sociology of knowl-
edge. The result is that discussions of practice or research 
tend to focus on methods based on experience and/or 
research, while philosophical discussions of the justifying 
reasons for those methods-moral or epistemological-can 
be rather thin at best, or even incoherent. 
Challenges to Traditional Positions 
While special education was growing up in the last half 
of the 20th century, radical changes were taking place in the 
physical and social sciences and in technology. As special 
education researchers and policy makers were developing 
and extending the knowledge bases for practice and policy, 
the philosophy of science was changing and creating a com-
plex conversation about the nature of knowledge. The tradi-
tional positivism that had guided many of the social sci-
ences, and certainly had a pervasive influence on special 
education philosophy and research in the form of behavior-
ism, has been severely challenged by philosophers of sci-
ence (Popper, 197 4). 
By the end of the century, the conventional positivist-
based assumptions about objectivity and certainty had 
changed and alternative understandings of knowledge occu-
pied a prominent position in the scholarship of different 
social sciences and humanities. The "new" discourses on 
research in the social sciences and humanities have focused 
more on topics such as the nature and power of language 
(Rorty, 1989), the assumptions about common realities, the 
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connection of observers and observations, ethics, and mean-
ing (Foucault, 1972; Rorty, 1989; Gadamer, 1976; Goodman 
1978). 
Changes in the philosophies of social science contributed 
to a loss of consensus in understanding and interpreting 
education research, and multiple discourses emerged as re-
flected in the literature in the 1990's (Cizek, 1995; Danforth, 
1995; Garrison, 1994; Heshusius, 1994; Skrtic, 1991). Hav-
ing grown out of psychology and medicine, special educa-
tion researchers were concerned with the learning and 
behavioral characteristics of children and interventions to 
address their needs. Notwithstanding, some important work 
dating back to the 1980s (lano, 1986; Heshusius, 1989) and 
early 1990s (Skrtic, 1991) challenging the dominant philos-
ophy of research in special education, most special educa-
tion researchers, especially in the fields of behavior disor-
ders and learning disabilities, generally have maintained a 
strong commitment to a positivist epistemology (Kauffman, 
1999; Sasso, 2001) 
Special education researchers, guided by a well devel-
oped and robust philosophy of behavior, generated a sub-
stantial knowledge base of technologies for defining and 
engineering change in behavior. The behavioral philosophy 
served the field well in the late 1960s, 1970s, and into the 
1980s (and many would argue that it continues to serve the 
field well). Special education grew to a multibillion dollar 
service industry and became predictably self-referenced. 
That is, special education researchers relied increasingly on 
the growing knowledge base about special education poli-
cies and practices and less on knowledge in the social sci-
ence disciplines. It lost the deep relationship with disciplines 
such as psychology that had guided much of its earlier work 
(Paul et al., 1992). One consequence of this history is that 
the changing epistemological perspectives in the social sci-
ences have not been reflected in mainstream special educa-
tion research. 
The general question is not only whether gains in special 
education research, and the epistemology guiding that 
research, are valid and useful. Rather, a more basic question 
is whether there is a justifiable reason for limiting research 
and scholarship in special education to a positivist perspec-
tive. Ethical issues are relevant in the manner in which the 
freedom of scholarship is supported or curtailed. They aiso 
are relevant in defending principles, including principles of 
scholarship. 
The ethical issue in the politics of knowledge is compli-
cated by the fluid state of arguments about knowledge in the 
social sciences. The resolution should occur in informed 
communities of scholars who are sensitive to the limits on 
what we know at the present time and appreciate the need 
for an open ethical discourse to enable us to learn from those 
who hold different views. 
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CONCLUDING PERSPECTIVE 
Since the development of the modem field of special edu-
cation in the middle of the 20th century, the pressure to iden-
tify and provide an appropriate education for children with 
disabilities has occupied the full attention of special educa-
tors. It is unfortunate that, in this context, "special education 
training programs regarding collegial relationships, research 
projects, and policy-making processes have given only 
superficial attention to how we might best resolve our ethical 
problems" (Howe & Miramontes, 1992, p. xiii). 
The growth of special education as a useful and valued 
set of programs has been limited by several realities. Facts 
are blunted by fictions about disabilities, the vision of edu-
cation as science or as art has been clouded by philosophi-
cal differences among educators, and the research agenda 
has been thwarted by a lack of consensus on a philosophy of 
inquiry. Accountability measures burden practitioners with 
excessive paper, and policy makers continue to be conflicted 
in justifying the escalating costs in view of the perceived 
social benefit of special education practices. 
The absence of training and research in ethics has been a 
regrettable omission. However efficacious the interventions, 
however credible the research, and however informed the poli-
cies, the education of children with disabilities is a morally 
complex set of activities with many ethical challenges. Both 
the political theory within which special education policies are 
rationalized and the ethical justifications for practice require 
thoughtful attention in fashioning the psychological founda-
tions that will bear the weight of challenges to the field. 
Our teacher education and doctoral programs should pre-
pare teachers and potential leaders in the field to understand 
and respect the complexities of different epistemological tra-
ditions and to engage in ethical as well as technical analyses 
of issues in research and practice. These are policy issues that 
should engage the interests and imaginations of special edu-
cation as a field and not be limited to the preferences of a few. 
Special education is in a place unlike any in its history. It 
is being attacked in the media, condemned by unaccountable 
assertions of inefficacy or, worse, unethical practices. For all 
we know about the power of the context in shaping behav-
ior, we must take care in interpreting current signals about 
the professional standing of special education. 
We are in an age of deep transformation, when discipli-
nary boundaries are frayed and traditions are coming to 
terms with competing understandings of knowledge and dif-
ferent moral visions of education. Neither a bunker mental-
ity designed to protect hard-won gains nor a position that 
gives equal standing to all views, irrespective of ethical and 
epistemological content, is going to serve the interest of the 
field in the future. The maturity of the professional dis-
course found in the American Psychologist or in the AERA 
journals would seem to be appropriate models. These jour-
nals, while clearly anchored in established discipline-based 
traditions, include diverse views and the scholarly work of 
different discourse communities. 
Three issues stand out as among the most critical to sus-
taining the work of special educators. 
1. We must recognize the implications of the minority 
status of students with disabilities in a liberal democ-
racy. The tension between the conservative and lib-
eral understandings of the society's obligation to pro-
vide appropriate education and care for all citizens is 
a central issue in the formation of public policy. Mod-
ern-day special education began in the 1960s, when 
advocacy for minorities (African Americans, women, 
children, persons with disabilities, and others) had a 
strong footing in the cultural zietgeist of the era. The 
minority status of these groups was a positive feature 
that legitimized the advocacy movement on their 
behalf. Things have changed. The rights of those who 
are less able to compete, and those with gifts less 
likely to be acknowledged in the competitive market-
place of public education, now must be defended on 
new terms. The present environment pits teachers 
against teachers, schools against schools, and chil-
dren against children in competing for public 
resources. The present political context is fraught 
with hazzards for those who need special supports to 
succeed, including students with disabilities. 
2. The inclusion of all children in general education pro-
grams is an ethical as well as an empirical matter. 
Determining the ethical interest of the child is a mat-
ter that must be considered in the presence of infor-
mation about how and where the child's needs are best 
met. Although the educational policy issue turns on a 
consideration of the rights and interests of all children, 
the understanding of rights and interests is constrained 
by the educational imagination of the policy makers. 
Those who make policies and those who implement 
them function in social contexts in which their judg-
ments are confounded by political forces that have 
moral meaning. Examples include preoccupation with 
high-stakes testing, mythologies about disability, 
unchallenged and uninformed mindsets about what 
education is and how it occurs, race, gender, and class-
biased models of what a classroom and a school should 
look like. The inclusion debate is a major special edu-
cation policy issue with significant ethical implica-
tions, but it is not a special education issue alone. The 
ethical issues are, perhaps, most dramatically evident 
in the practical interface of special and general edu-
cation where children being "included" live their 
lives. The quality of their lives is impacted directly 
by the outcomes of debates that can overlook the real 
dependent variables essential to the social, emo-
tional, and spiritual well-being of children. 
3. The debate about what counts for knowledge must be 
open and respectful. The issues are of vital interest to 
the field and, more important, to the children whom 
special educators serve. Andrews et al. (2000) distin-
guished between incremental reformers and substan-
tial reconceptualists in special education. Incremental 
reformers emphasize the positive, known features of 
special education and support systematic improvement 
of practice through established approaches. Substan-
tial reconceptualists take more of a critical perspective 
and see more serious problems in the knowledge and 
ethical foundations of special education. They support 
more fundamental changes in the field. 
Andrews and his colleagues, including the first author of 
the present article, advocate bridging the divide. They com-
ment: "We need to push ahead with traditional and nontra-
ditional research for improving knowledge and practice 
about enhancing individual student capacity and promoting 
a caring school culture in which the lines between student 
categories meld. Our shared goal is the welfare of students 
with disabilities and all children" (p. 267). They acknowl-
edge the challenge and affirm an optimism that the field can 
bridge the divide. The present authors share the hope that 
the divide can be bridged with respectful appreciation of dif-
ferent points of view and an affirmation of the values of a 
diverse academic community of special educators. 
Multiple discourses are required to instantiate the complex-
ities of ethics and knowledge in special education, but neither 
essentialist dogma nor relativist ideology is likely to spawn 
sites of mutual respect and understanding. Both the art and the 
social science of educating all children must occupy a promi-
nent place at tables where the moral vision of care and educa-
tion, as well as the instrumental efficacy of instructional prac-
tices and schooling, are imagined and formed. Differences in 
perspective between individuals or groups who hold positions 
at variance with others, no matter how well established and 
anchored in precedent or interesting and different, need not be 
divisive or defeat legitimate professional purposes. 
The lack of know ledge among the wisest of us and the 
lack of humility among those of us who are most audacious 
have left all of us without a shared vision of leadership that 
connects us to the common moral purpose of improving the 
lives of children with disabilities and their families. Special 
education is not lacking intellectual capital; however, the 
press of the discontinuity between the outcomes of practice 
and the promises of the law has created urgency in defend-
ing the entire project of educational support for children 
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with disabilities. Struggles over control of voice have, in 
some instances, created a culture of rancor and cynicism. 
Hope for a rapprochement that enables productive scholar-
ship and advancement of the field rests, in part, on the 
courage and good will, as well as the perspicacity, of lead-
ers who influence doctoral education programs, research 
funding priorities, and journal policies. 
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